The Battle of Kadesh was likely the largest chariot engagement in ancient military history, which was fought between the Egyptians under Ramses the Second and the Hittites under Muwatallis, in 1275 B.C.E. The Battle of Kadesh was the culmination of years of military preparation and trial of strength between the Hittites and the Egyptians, in which elements of the celebrated principles of warfare were demonstrated in this conflict. The principles of war are military instructions for the conduct and prosecution of war and they consist of mass, maneuver, objective, offensive, security, simplicity, surprise, unity of command, and economy of force. The principles of surprise, security, offensive, and unity of command were the primary tenets operating in the battle of kadesh. In addition, while the combat weapons have evolved technologically, military tactics, battle strategy, and war doctrines have remain the same since the Battle of Kadesh.
Kadesh Battlefield Analysis
The Battle of Kadesh began in Syria, southwest of ?im?, on the Orontes River. While trying to retake the Hittite-held city of Kadesh in Syria, Ramses invaded Syria with four combat divisions and other supporting troops: Amun division, Re division, Seth division, and the newly formed Ptah division. The Egyptian Army consisted of chariots and foot soldiers. Muwatallis created a large military coalition consisting of many chariots and infantry men derived from his vassal states. When his army was hiding behind the city mound, Muwatallis sent out bogus intelligence reports saying that he was at Aleppo, farther north.
Because Ramses fell for the trap, he hurried his army toward Kadesh, his units stretched along the Orontes valley road. By evening, the king with the first division reached Kadesh and set up his camp. Before the battle, two captured Hittite scouts confessed to the Egyptians the actual details of the Hittite strategy, but it was too late to save Ramses’ first division. The Hittites crossed the river and, subsequent to routing the second division, attacked the Egyptian camp. The Hittite Army almost achieved a decisive victory against the Egyptian Army, but their military personnel stopped to loot the enemy camp rather than continuing the offensive attack on the Egyptian Army.
During the Hittite looting, Egyptian reinforcements arrived on the battlefield to assist Ramses and his troops in combat operations. Since his first division was destroyed, Ramses was saved primarily by his secondary reinforcement units that struck the attacking Hittites in the rear. After forcing the Hittite Army into the river, the batter Egyptians retained the battlefield. The following day, after indecisive fighting, Ramses was forced to withdraw his battered army; and, in the aftermath the engagement, the Hittites advanced south to the region of Damascus, stopping the Egyptian resurgence into Syria.
Egyptian and Hittite Version of Kadesh Battle
The biased Egyptian version of the battle was recorded on numerous temples by Ramses, but a Hittite version excavated at Boghazköy has enabled a truer assessment of the battle. In addition, Hittite references to the battle have been found at Hattusa, although no annals have been discovered that might describe it as part of a campaign. Remses later signed a peace treaty with the Hittites which would forever place Kadesh out of Egyptian hands.
In conclusion, while the battle of Kadesh was a draw between the Egyptians and the Hittites, this engagement revealed the effective and ineffective utilization of the principle of surprise, security, offensive, and unity of command. Muwatallis executed the principle of surprise effectively by striking the Egyptian army at a time and place where Ramses did not expect. However, Muwatallis failed at procuring the principle of security when his Hittite spies were captured and force to reveal the Hittite plan of attack to Ramses. The Hittites failed to exploit the principle of offensive attack by looting the enemy camps. Although Ramses made mistakes in this battle, he demonstrated his tactical military prowess by making the necessary adjustments in the fog and confusion of combat. This was achieved because of Ramses’ execution of the unity of command. Although Muwatallis was a good strategist and tactician, Ramses personnel courage and relentless determination delivered his army from almost certain defeat. Ramses was a fine general and leader, but he often let his ambition ignored reality, and his reign was quite a strain on Egypt's resources. Both Ramses and Muwatallis had prepared for this great battle before they became kings of their respective countries.
References:
Dunnigan, James F. How to Make War. William Morrow and Company, INC: New York NY, 1993.
Holmes, Richard. Battlefield Decisive Conflicts in History. Oxford University Press, 2006.
Kohn, George Childs. Dictionary of Wars. Checkmark Books: New York NY, 1999.
Lanning, LT. COL. Michael Lee. The Battle 100; Source Books: Naperville, Illinois, 2003.
Ryan, Ph.D., Donald P. Ancient Egypt. Alpha Books: Indianapolis IN, 2002.
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