Leadership
The Philip who lost the Macedonian kingdom’s power to Rome on the battlefield during the years 200-198 B.C.E. was an inept king2, and badly misused1 the phalanx compared to many leaders which it had enjoyed before – including Philip II, who invented it. Two other examples are Alexander the Great, and Pyrrhus of Epirus1– the man who won two resounding victories over Rome’s legions on Italian soil before withdrawingA. Philip II, Alexander, and Pyrrhus all used the phalanx in similar fashion 2– as the tough, hard-hitting core of an army which gave it plenty of support from heavy cavalry and light infantry on its flanks. On the battlefield, this led to a laundry list of great victories and very few defeats2,3.
The less successful Philip and some of his near-contemporaries raised and fielded armies which were almost entirely phalanx2. At that point, history already provided many examples of what happens to heavy infantry armies, when not supported by enough cavalry: they get outflanked by more mobile troops, and die2,3. Many such examples were recent, courtesy of Roman disasters during the Second Punic War which ended in 2012,3. A king who forgot the lessons of a titanic war after only one year, was probably capable of losing Macedon to any threat of credible size.
To make matters worse, this same last Philip had made himself so detested by the cities of Greece that they welcomed and supported Roman intervention2.
Changes
In ‘On the Phalanx’, the roman Polybius describes a phalanx quite different from those maintained by Philip and Alexander2, and every change degraded it1. Polybius describes a phalanx used primarily for a single ‘irresistible’ offensive charge; its defensive prowess under Philip and Alexander has been forgotten. Unlike the unit’s first incarnation, this phalanx has no shields, possibly no armor either. Worse perhaps than the other changes combined, it is inflexible and totally ineffective when not on ‘flat and level ground’, the very terrain which favors its Achilles heels, light infantry and cavalry.
Roman Power
Unaltered and with good leadership, the phalanxes of Macedon probably would have eventually fallen to the overwhelming power of Rome as a whole.B Rome had just secured the defeat of its archrival Carthage in the Second Punic War, and as the Romans repaired damage done by the Carthaginian invasion, and developed the new dominions they had won in Spain during the conflict, their power was set to grow rapidly2,3. The Romans would have simply kept coming until they wore Macedon down.
As Rome had proved against Hannibal, one spend a decade crushing Rome’s armies, yet still be defeated Rome in war2,3.
Therefore, inadvisable changes to the Macedonian phalanx and poor leadership from the Macedonian king probably just hastened the inevitable eclipse of the phalanx by Rome’s legions.
A: His ‘phyrric’ victories here were far more costly to Rome’s armies than his own, they merely looked too costly for him to afford many more of them.
B: Though perhaps not if they’d been lead by Alexander.
Sources
1. Arrian. The Campaigns of Alexander. Translation by De Selincourt, Aubrey. Introduction by Hamilton, J.R. New York: Penguin Group, 1971. Penguin Books USA, inc., New York 10014.
2. Polybius. The Rise of the Roman Empire. Translation by Scott-Kilvert, Ian. New York: Penguin Group, 1979. Penguin Press, Inc., New York 10014.
3.Cottrell, Leonard. Hannibal: Enemy of Rome. New York: Da Capo Press, 1992. Da Capo Press Inc, New York 10013.
